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## THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING BROTHERHOOD.

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THE discussion of an Anglo-Saxon alliance, while evoking almost universal enthusiasm and approval, both in Great Britain and in the United States, has called forth serious criticisms and strictures. These objections have come from those who are either decidedly inimical to such an alliance, or who at least show no friendly attitude toward it, but they have been undoubtedly directed toward the weakest points of this great and all-important scheme. When, however, we find that these vulnerable parts are in no way essential to the main stem and body, and that, by lopping them off, we can ensure the only form of sane and healthy growth, these criticisms ought to be gratefully considered at this early stage.

Mr. Davitt has shown that the American nation cannot be considered as consisting of Anglo-Saxons. He has pointed to the people of Irish birth or descent as a strong component element in the American nation. That this is true as regards the Irish cannot be doubted, and it can be extended to other nationalities within the American people clearly not of Anglo-Saxon origin. Whatever the practical reasons for speaking of such an alliance as an Anglo-Saxon Alliance may be, as a matter of accurate statement these terms can never convey and cover adequately the ideas which they are meant to represent. An alliance between the British Empire and the United States of America cannot rightly be called an Anglo-Saxon alliance; nor do we mean "Anglo-Saxon" when we have in mind the British Empire, or even the English people.

Take the case of the English people. Who can define, with any claim to scientific accuracy, the ethnological elements to be

found in the earliest pre-historic inhabitants who were followed by Celts, Romans, Angles, Jutes, Danes, Saxons and Normans? Who can give accurate value, in the formation of the English people, its government, policy, its intellectual, social and economical life, to the subsequent immigration of Dutch and Flemish, French Huguenot, Italian, Jewish weavers and craftsmen, bankers and traders, thinkers and artists? All these elements combined and intermingled, merged and fused into one another in the social and political unity of the people, have made the British Empire of to-day. It profits little to disintegrate these component parts and weigh them separately in the scales of abstract science; it mars much, however, to turn this inaccurate abstract thought into action, into practical life and politics. If this be true of the dwellers in England itself, and of the English people of the present, it is still more true when we consider Ireland, not to mention the transfusion of the Anglo-Saxon in Scotland with Celtic and other ethnological elements.

Unfortunately, the misdeeds and blunders of those who governed England in the past, as well as the leading questions of actual politics in our own days, have made the Irish question synonymous with the measure of separateness claimed by, or to be given to, the inhabitants of Ireland. But there is another side to the Irish question which should be recognized as equally interesting and instructive. That is the actual and historical claims which Irish people have to be an integral and important part of the British people, and in the making of the British Empire. If there be glory in the making of such an empire and justified pride in the strength and superiority of such a nation, the Irish people, whether they accept it or not, have an undeniable title to such glory. I am not only thinking of great individuals who made, framed or modified the lasting fabric of the empire. I am not only bearing in mind the huge number of great Englishmen who inherited their personal greatness perhaps more from their Irish mother than from their English father; but I am thinking of the compact army of Irish Britons who have helped to fight British battles, and of the armies of working men who have contributed by their skill and by their labor to the supremacy of British manufacture and trade, and who had so great a share in the early formation of the thriving British colonies.

Can we, even after a hasty consideration of these facts, use the

term Anglo-Saxon in connection with Greater Britain in any way except as a figure of speech, and a very inaccurate one at that? And when such a figure of speech is not only misleading in thought, but may offend the feelings of great masses of people and thus cripple or stultify or misdirect action, what use can there be in using it at all?

If now we turn to the United States, the term Anglo-Saxon is still more inaccurate and misleading. It is true, and will always remain so, that the substructure of American national life is English in language, and in its social and political institutions. But ethnologically the American nation presents a huge and unequalled mixture of different European races.

The term "Anglo-Saxon," accordingly, besides being inaccurately pedantic and fundamentally untrue when used as signifying the uniting element between the two great peoples, is as misleading in America as it is in Great Britain, and comes dangerously near to the natural prejudices of both peoples. These prejudices can be skillfully awakened and intensified, and will be effectively used on the numerous occasions which will present themselves, by those whose interest it is to keep the two nations asunder.

Further, I object to the term "Anglo-Saxon," when used to qualify the amity or alliance between Great Britain and the United States, because it opens the door to that most baneful and pernicious of modern national diseases, namely, Ethnological Chauvinism. The slightest infusion of such a spirit suggested by the term "Anglo-Saxon" will not only stultify the efforts toward closer national amity, but may produce disintegrating disturbances even in the internal national life of these countries.

Chauvinism can in no sense be called an outcome, or even a modification, of patriotism. They are two distinct, if not opposed, ideas, the following of either of which points to characters and temperaments as different as the generous are from the covetous. Patriotism is a positive attitude of the soul, Chauvinism is a negative tendency or passion. Patriotism is the love of and devotion to the fatherland, to the wider or the more restricted home, and to the common interests and aspirations and ideals of these. Chauvinism marks an attitude antagonistic to all persons, interests and ideas, not within this wider or narrower fatherland or home. Patriotism is love, Chauvinism is jealousy. The

loving temperament makes for expansion, the jealous tends toward contraction and restriction. While the patriot who loves his people and his country is therefore likely to be tolerant, even generous and affectionate, toward the stranger, the Chauvinist is likely to direct the burning fire of his animosity even toward special spheres and groupings within his own country. Now, this vice of hatred and envy, which may have existed in all times and places of human history, has in our own times received a peculiar character, a special formulation, with an attempt at justification. I have tried to qualify the general Chauvinism in the form predominant in our time by the attribute, "Ethnological Chauvinism."

The origin of this disease within the nations of Europe may be traced back first to Napoleon, when, with the inner growth of France and its powers and his successes in Italy, he coupled the designed enfeeblement, if not the destruction, of the German Empire by its division into insignificant principalities under his own influence. There is no doubt he conceived the bold idea of the predominance of the Latin race and empire over the Teutonic race and over the world in general. But he found himself wedged in between two forces which checked the advance of this Latin Hegemony and ultimately crushed him. On the one side was the Slav, on the other side the Briton. He succeeded for the time in repressing the Teuton, but he failed both in Russia and in his struggle with Great Britain.

As a reaction against this Latin wave, which submerged the Teuton Empire, the German patriots endeavored to revive the vitality of the sturdy Teutonic oak. But, while the Latin crusade had for its inspiring preacher the great leader and man of action himself, the Germanic revival fell to the lot of the theorist and thinker, and a German philosopher and professor, Fichte, in his "*Reden an die Deutsche Nation*," was the fullest exponent of its views. These again were further formulated and carried into the realms of romantic thought, theory and science by the learned enthusiasts who led the Revolution of 1848 in Germany.

But, again, there turned up a great man of action, who, knowing his countrymen and the trend of the times, utilized all these influences to weld together the separate blocks—smoothly polished marbles of Prince-ridden principalities, and clumsy, unhewn stones and rubble-stones of independent cities and towns—

into the huge edifice of the German Empire. The scientific spirit which was pervading the civilized world of Western Europe was recognized by Bismarck as a useful force which could be turned into practical advantage for the great purpose he had in view. He called upon the German professor—even the ethnologist, philologist and historian—and they obeyed his command with readiness and alacrity. The theoretical and scientific lever with which these huge building blocks were to be raised in order to construct the German Empire was to be the scientific establishment of the unity of the German people, based upon the unity of Germanic races. An historical basis for German unity was not enough, an ethnological, racial unity had to be established. The historical and philological literature of German university professors belonging to the time of Bismarck's ascendancy can almost be recognized and classified by their relation to the problem of establishing, fixing, and distinguishing from other races the laws and customs, literature, languages and religions, the life and thought, the productions and the aspirations of the Germanic races.

This influence went beyond the bounds of Germany; by a sympathy in England, Freeman and those who felt with him thumped the Saxon drum; while, by contrast, in France the *Fustel de Coulanges* played variations in softer strains on the theme of the *Cité Antique*. In course of time Russia, in the growing vigor of its racial and national expansion, formulated and developed its Pan-Slavistic theory and war cry.

The distinctive feature in this modern version of the old story of national lust of power is, that it now assumed a more serious and stately garb of historical justice in the pedantic pretensions of its inaccurate ethnological theories. The absurdity of any application of such ethnological theories to the practical politics of modern nations at once becomes manifest when an attempt is made to classify the inhabitants of any one of these western nations by means of such racial distinctions. What becomes of the racial unity of the present German Empire, if we consider the Slavs of Prussia, the Wends in the north and the tangle of different racial occupations and interminglings during the last thousand years within every portion of the German country? And the same applies to France and England, Italy and Spain.

But the German professor, with his political brief wrapped

round his lecture notes, was forced further afield and deeper down in his "scientific" distinctions. The divisions he established for the purposes of national policy were but minor sub-divisions of broader ethnological distinctions. Here the philologist took the lead and established "beyond all doubt" the difference, nay, the antagonism, between the Aryan and the Semitic, which makes the Hindoo more closely related to the German and Saxon than these are to Spinoza, Mendelssohn and Heine, Carl Marx and Disraeli.

This last named classification could further be turned to practical advantage by those in Germany whose interest it would be to set one part of the German people against another section, and to create a new party or to strengthen the hands of decrepit old ones. And thus there grew up the Anti-semitic parties in Germany and elsewhere, who could give strength and some semblance of sober dignity to their party passions or violent economic theories, by so respectable a scientific justification as a racial distinction fixed thousands of years ago. This step once made, however, has necessarily led into wider and unsafer regions, the exploitation of which may ultimately lead to most disastrous results. For, when once the distinction between Aryan and Semite led to the Anti-semitic movement, religious prejudices, or, at all events, religious distinctions, were necessarily carried in the wake and tended to serious complications. Were it not for the clamorous interests of recent politics in the East and West, as well as in Africa and Asia, which absorb the attention and the passions of the nations of Europe, I believe that the current Ethnological Chauvinism would have drifted more and more into the channels of religious Chauvinism.

There were striking indications within the last few years that the ethnological game was played out. In Russia the Pan-Slavistic cry was growing feebler and feebler and was gradually merging into something like a Pan-Orthodox movement, which carried very practical, if not material, plans and purposes within the religious breast of its spiritual devotion. Feeble echoes of Pan-Anglicanism made themselves heard; while the Catholic Church followed its old tradition, and the national and Germanic ardor of Berlin, if not of the whole of Germany, was diverted from the monster statues on the hills of the Rhine and the Teutoburger forest to the national Protestant churches in the German capitals.

Arminius was, after all, a Pagan! And if this new old cry is silenced for a time by the din of gatling guns, the axes of the colonizer, and the hammer of the colonial prospector, it is not silenced for good and all, and will shortly be raised again.

The result of all this is that old antagonisms have been intensified by the introduction of these ethnological distinctions, and that new ones have been created to swell their nefarious phalanx. No doubt, other passions have been added to them, the greed of gold and the lust of empire.

England is the only country in Europe which has not yet been affected to any harmful extent by this disease of Chauvinism; and there is no fear that, in spite of all the provocation which the attitude of other nations toward her arouses, she will respond to them in the same tone. But, to call an alliance, or the growing amity, between Great Britain and the United States an Anglo-Saxon alliance, and to accept such a term as embodying the essential bond of union between these two great nations, would familiarize us with evil ideas, if it did not create evil passions. What brings us, and will hold us, together is something quite different, and far more potent than the empty words and the unsound theories with regard to our racial origin.

The question, then, arises: What are the essential elements which hold people together? Sir John Seeley maintained that "the chief forces which hold a community together are common nationality, common religion, common interest." I believe that this epitome errs in omitting some elements which are perhaps the most efficient in binding people together, while at least one of the three is not essential to national unity or national amity.

I should prefer to summarize these elements under the following general headings: A common country; a common nationality; a common language; common forms of government; common culture, including customs and institutions; a common history; a common religion, in so far as religion stands for the same basis of morality; and, finally, common interests.

Now, when any group of people have all these eight elements in common, they ought of necessity to form a political unity; and when a group of people have not the first of these factors (the same country) but are essentially akin in the remaining seven, they ought to develop some close form of lasting amity.



In the case of the people of Great Britain and of the United States, seven of these leading features are actively present.

It may even be held that the first condition, a common country, which would make of the two peoples one nation, in some sense exists for them. At all events, a country is sufficiently common to them to supply sentimental unity in this direction. For, as regards England, Seeley has well remarked, referring to a period when steam and electricity had not yet reduced the separating distance of the ocean:

**"There is this fundamental difference between Spain and France on the one side and England on the other, that Spain and France were deeply involved in the struggle of Europe, from which England has always been able to hold herself aloof. In fact, as an island, England is distinctly nearer for practical purposes to the New World and almost belongs to it, or at least has the choice of belonging at her pleasure to the New World or to the Old."**

If we turn from the question of mere physical propinquity to the feeling of the American people as regards the country, the actual soil, of the British Islands, we come to a sentiment deep and cogent in its binding power. But a small minority of Americans would not be overcome by a sense of home the moment they arrived on British soil. The monuments on which they gaze in Westminster Abbey commemorate patriots, statesmen and poets whom they can rightly claim as essentially their own! To all these people, Great Britain is the "Old Country." This does not apply only to the Americans of distinctly British origin, but also to those of German and French and Dutch or other European descent, whose home has been sufficiently long in the United States for them to have become thoroughly nationalized through the language, the customs and institutions which are practically the same in both countries. Such an one has read his Shakespeare, Macaulay and Walter Scott from his childhood upward; and thus Westminster Abbey and Stratford-on-Avon and Kenilworth and Scotland strike an old familiar chord in his mind and his heart.

Leaving the question of a common country, the bond of union becomes closer the further we proceed with the other essential influences which make for unity, when once we drop the misleading and wholly illusory ethnological basis of nationality, and take into account the process of real history. We then must acknowledge that the people of Great Britain and of the United States are of one nationality. I say this in spite of the Revolutionary War,

and, if I did not fear to be too paradoxical, I should almost say because of it. I mean by this, that the establishment of independence in the British Colonies of North America marks a phase in the expansion of international freedom, as the advance of representative government marks the development of national freedom; and that, as the recognition of the separate household of an adult son who has been fretting with growing animosity against the domination of parental authority re-asserts, on a new and more propitious basis, the kinship of the two, so is it in the relation of the two nations since America became free. There is but one real and material fact among many to which I wish to draw attention in view of the claims of common nationality between these two great peoples, and that is, the question of kinship and intermarriage. If statistics could be established concerning the citizens of each country, as to those who have some member of their kith and kin, however remote, residing in the country over the sea, the numbers of these would be found to be astonishingly large—at all events, much larger than such relationship between any other two nations. And in this respect the importance of the continuous process of intermarriage, which promises to grow even more frequent and effective in the future, cannot be overestimated. For intermarriage is the most important factor in welding the diversity of race into the unity of nationality.

But the unity of nationality is expressed in the state, in the laws and the forms of government, which actually hold the people together. Now, though England is a monarchy and the United States a republic, the inhabitants of both countries feel that they belong to the freest nations of the world. This freedom is the outcome of representative government, an idea and a fact born in England, of the development of which the history of the British people is one continuous illustration. It does not diminish the glory of the framers of the American Constitution to say that the central idea of liberty and self-government, which that document embodies and develops, was the natural evolution of political principles sunk deep down in their hearts and minds by their British ancestors. The reality of a common foundation for the government and all political institutions in the case of the United States and of Great Britain impresses itself upon us, not only when we ponder or generalize on things political, but when we are living our ordinary daily lives and follow the natural interests

and needs of our several avocations. It is not merely a question of political theory and speculation, it is eminently one of practical experience and of the action of life, individual as well as collective. At every step while the Englishman or American travels abroad, even in the most civilized countries, he meets with administrative enactments, privileges, restrictions, injunctions and directions, sent from the summits of government into the busy plains of ordinary daily life, which are foreign to him and which evoke a sense of criticism, if not of irritation and revolt. The same feeling of strangeness and of foreignness constantly comes over him, if he attempts to follow their political life, whether the American consider the legislative and administrative proceedings of a European republic, or the Englishman study the laws and enactments of some other constitutional monarchy. On the other hand, every Englishman becomes readily familiar with the political system of the United States and feels at home under its rule, as the American lives happily under the laws of Great Britain and can follow with interest the work of the House of Commons.

Far more potent, however, than the ties of common descent, country and government, is the all-comprising bond of a common language. Language is the chief vehicle of human thought and its communication. No other vehicle covers the whole range of human experiences from the highest to the lowest as does language. And if we compare the more emotional, the artistic, aspect of language, with the other arts, which are all such powerful exponents of the national and historical life of a people, we must assign to the literary art an exceptional position, as conveying the distinct individuality of a nation with more directness and precision than any of the others.

But it is on the more purely linguistic side that language becomes such a force in national life and gives such distinctness and solidarity to the communities which have the same language in common. Great statesmen have ever recognized this; as is clear when we consider the efforts made in Prussia to introduce the German language into Poland, the troubles of the Austrian Empire in dealing with the Czech and German languages in Bohemia, or the power of the mere Italian language in giving substance to the cry of *Italia Irridente* in districts nowise Italian, and with populations of ethnological origin quite distinct from the main bulk of the Italian people.

It is further interesting to watch how delicate and sensitive an instrument a language is in reflecting peculiar, even subtle, national characteristics. A study of the nature, history and significance of the foreign words borrowed or domesticated in a language, will reveal much about the position of language in national life, and about the national life itself. In the literature of Continental nations, besides the whole vocabulary of field sports and pastimes, which they have directly borrowed in their English form, are to be found such words as "self-government," "gentleman," "fair play," "the morning tub." And in our books you will find "esprit" and "chic" and "Chauvinism" and "*homme du monde*" and "roué," as well as "Zeitgeist" and "Sehnsucht," "Gemüthlichkeit"—perhaps even "Bakshish" and "Kismet." If one ponders on such words, and what they stand for, one may learn much about the national life of the different peoples. The ideas of self-government, of fair-play, of gentleman, do not only happen to be expressed in English. The facts which the words embody—the soul of the thing—were born among the English-speaking peoples, and these terms correspond to the essential, most lasting, most prevalent and most characteristic features of the life of the people in Great Britain and in the United States.

But language in this aspect reflects more than thoughts and feelings; it shows the common customs of living as well. People who, besides speaking the same tongue, eat and drink in the same manner, find their pleasure in games and sports, and in contemplating the same plays and pageants, to whom the "morning tub" is an essential instrument of daily life, such people not only live together in peace, but they ought to live together.

I have already referred to the influence derived from the fact that we read the same books. The people of the United States hardly feel that their debit account to England, with regard to poets and writers, is greater than their credit account; because they consider British authors their own, as the Englishman claims Poe and Longfellow and Emerson, and Lowell and Bret Harte, Mark Twain, Howells and Aldrich and James. So with the artists born in America, who are fully domesticated in England, and the actors who divide their performances between the two countries, while chairs in universities and schools in America are, and have been, held by Britons, and the interchange is daily growing more active and frequent. Day by day our life in every sphere

is becoming so thoroughly interwoven and intertwined, that not only the merchant, manufacturer and farmer, but the author and artist, nay, the student in his remote study, must consider the sister country while he is working for his own.

We have, moreover, a common history. Whatever the Revolutionary War may have meant and means to the people of the United States, it can only be regarded as a natural step in the British struggle for self-government and independence. Meanwhile, the whole of American history before 1776 is to be found, not with Red Indians, but with the people of Great Britain. And what Seeley has expressed so vigorously and clearly for the Britons, when they regard Greater Britain, that the British Colonies form an integral part of Greater Britain, and that every English political view which does not include the national life of Australasia and Canada is crippled and distorted—this applies to the attitude which the Britons must hold ever to the United States. The United States have not only formed a central factor in the British history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but they are an essential element in the growth of national life in the present, and will become still more vital in the future.

I have more than once quoted Sir John Seeley's "Expansion of England." There is much in this book with which I heartily agree, still more that I admire unreservedly. But I decidedly disagree with him in the state-making importance he assigns to religion among communities on an advanced scale of political civilization. I mean the power of religion as a fixed Church or Creed in the formation of a State, as an element which binds communities together. Though a common creed may be powerful in bringing or holding together people or races or nations in comparatively early stages of development, this cannot be maintained in the more advanced stages of modern politics.

In Italy, for instance, one Church preponderates among the population, with hardly a dissentient sect that might not be considered a *negligeable* quantity. Yet it can hardly be said that this common creed was an active agent in unifying Italy in the past, or in holding together the Italian monarchy of our own immediate days. Germany, on the other hand, has in our days achieved complete Imperial unity; and yet in Prussia, a Protestant State, more than one-third are Roman Catholics; while in Baden and Bavaria nearly two-thirds are Roman Catholics.

The principle of religious toleration by the state, strangely sinned against by the early Pilgrim Fathers, is one of the fundamental principles in the political constitution of the United States; and, in spite of the existence of an established church in England, this principle is becoming more effective in the political and social life of Great Britain with every day.

While religion, therefore, in the sense of a fixed Church or Creed, may be dismissed from the category of unifying influences, religion as a civilizing power, as creating or modifying the national conscience, the national ethics, as directing national aspirations and ideals, religion passing through the life and history of a people, is one of the most effective elements in political life. It leaves its deep and broad stamp upon national character, and thus creates or strengthens sympathy or antipathy, spiritual relationship or estrangement.

Thus, for instance, the Pilgrim Fathers, from the depths of their religious life, convictions and sufferings, did give a definite character to the national ethics of the United States: a stern sense of duty, of veracity and honesty, which, in spite of all individual instances in which these have been disregarded or contravened, permeate as leading principles the life of the American people in every phase. This is the historical resultant of the Puritan supremacy in America, and the British people passed through the same historical process in Europe. The Puritanism of the Commonwealth, nurtured by the Hebrew sense of abstract duty, derived direct from Moses, the Psalms and the Prophets, however violent, coarse or dry it may often have been, and however much, from an artistic or æsthetic point of view, we may deplore its effect upon the life of "Merry England," was and is a most potent factor in the historical evolution of the national ethics of Great Britain of our day.

This and many other religious elements, which in the course of history have made us think and feel as we do, the two nations have in common, and these bind us together more than could the mere adhesion to the same dogmatic creed. They make us feel at home in a country where, in the smallest dealings of daily life, we at once realize that the established expectations of truthfulness in word and deed, as well as the ultimate ideals of a high and noble life, are the same as in our own home. This common foundation of popular and national ethics and religion,

the American and the Briton who have travelled far afield realize as existing to a greater degree in each of these two countries than in any other land, and this will always act as a real and practically efficient link between the two nations.

Finally, I come to the question of Interests. The state of affairs which in the last few months has brought the question of an effective amity between the two great countries—allies by the fulfillment of all the other conditions we have just examined—within such close range of possible consummation and at least serious discussion, is the best answer to the doubt concerning the commonness of interest. In spite of all the historical, national, social and ethical relationships, the most sanguine of us could not have hoped, a short time ago, to see the discussion taken up seriously for the next fifty years. And now, by one move in the Far East of several Continental powers, bound together for the time being by common interests—and interests only—and by the thrilling and far-reaching events of the immediate present, the realization of these common interests on our part has made us see with the clearness of day the essential kinship between us in every aspect of our national life.

This condition of things is not fortuitous, nor isolated, so that it occurs once now, has never occurred before, and will never occur again! Whoever studies carefully the international history of 1823 will see how strikingly parallel the conditions were then to what they are now. Then as now England, the self-governing country, stood by the United States against the Continental powers forming the Holy Alliance; and, but for England, the united action of these powers would have crushed, not only the independence of the South American states, but would have jeopardized the development of American freedom. The Monroe Doctrine was, in one sense, as much the outcome of Canning's policy, as of the genius and statesmanship of Adams and Monroe.

But the social and economical conditions in the national life of every people have altered since 1823. The increase and facility of intercommunication have made the international organism more sensitive, and with it the commercial interdependence as affecting, not only manufacture, but even agriculture, has made it impossible for a nation to remain absolutely isolated and self-contained, and will in the future, if disregarded in its vital claims, lead to desiccation and ultimate annihilation of prosperity.

All great nations have now (some of them tardily) awakened to this fact. Hence the energetic activity displayed on all sides and the constant rivalry leading to the growth of Chauvinism. Great Britain, by centuries of continuous activity, probably by a natural aptitude of its people for colonization, and certainly by long national training of the government and the people, has stood powerfully in the forefront of the colonial and commercial expansion, and has therefore readily evoked the combined opposition of her several European rivals. But, as the late Austrian Premier, Goluchowski, wisely saw and stated more than a year ago, the Continental powers in this commercial struggle have to count, not only with Great Britain, but with the United States. These two go together as the most formidable rivals of the Continental powers. The United States can co-operate only with Great Britain in pursuing its material interests beyond its borders. For England is the great Free Trader, the champion of Open Ports. As a matter of fact, in South Africa and in all British Colonies, the proportion of citizens of the United States who have introduced American industries and have themselves accumulated great wealth, is much larger than people are wont to imagine. The expansion of England and its opening out of the world's ports to commerce, is *ipso facto* the expansion of American commerce without cost of blood and substance to the United States.

But these interests have to be maintained and safe-guarded against foreign prohibitive encroachment, and herein forces may have to be joined by those who have common interests. What would happen to the China trade of the United States, with its prospective growth in future years from the mere position of its Pacific coast, if Russia, Germany and France were to seize the ports and close them practically to all trade but their own? American statesmen have realized the gravity of the present situation, and have been led to recognize the interests which bind their country to Great Britain.

The trend of national and international life for the last hundred years has been toward the expansion of international trade into regions that formerly did not come actively into the cognizance of the European diplomat; and each state individually, or those with common interests collectively, must be prepared to guard and enforce this expansion. If the United States and any one of the British Colonies disregard this paramount interest



of their future and do not strengthen themselves by firm amity or alliance where such alliance is on every ground natural and imperative, they will some day find their national development and expansion checked. They will then come under the domination or tutelage of one of these great powers or a group of several of them, and the interests of such leading states will be paramount and dictate the course of national life to the one held in tutelage.

All this, however, would be rendered impossible by a great English-speaking Brotherhood. The Continental Powers know this, and the plan of their diplomacy must be to keep Great Britain and the United States asunder by playing them off one against the other. And for this the term "Anglo-Saxon" must yield them an acceptable opportunity.

We must not forget, however, that, after all, commerce is not everything. It is but the forerunner of civilization and receives its moral justification in that fact. Britons and Americans stand in the forefront of civilization; in political, social and economical education they stand as high as any nation, and higher than any group of nations that could be massed against them. In furthering our sphere of influence we are necessarily spreading the most advanced and highest results of man's collective efforts in the history of his civilization. An English-speaking Brotherhood will, after all, only be a step and link in the general alliance of civilized peoples. Its main principles and final objects will be those to which the highest and most cultured members of the French, German and even Russian nation would subscribe, and in so far, they would morally be members of this alliance.

Ideals are the lasting generalizations of past experiences and future aspirations. These will ever govern the world and stimulate men to action in one direction instead of another. These ideals are the same to the people of Great Britain and of the United States, and that is at once the highest and the most lasting bond of union.

CHARLES WALDSTEIN.